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Abstract 
Since 2001, 12 major defense acquisition programs (MDAPs) have been 
cancelled.  Although each of these programs had problems with cost or schedule 
overruns (or both), there were other MDAPs that had similar problems and were not 
cancelled.  Is it possible that program managers had information that might help 
determine which program was likely to survive and which was more likely to be 
cancelled? We employ a unique and rigorous statistical methodology to help 
program managers and their overseers understand and quantify the risk to their 
programs based on key earned value metrics.  We compare programs that were 
cancelled to programs that had significant cost overruns but were not cancelled.  We 
use survival analysis to investigate whether differences in key EV metrics reported 
for cancelled programs and “troubled” but not cancelled programs can be used to 
model the probability of cancellation for MDAPs. Our most significant finding across 
models is that when there is high cost growth in the EAC reported by the contractor, 
programs run far larger risks of cancellation.  We find less robust evidence that 
increases in PM estimates and high cost variance also can drive risk of program 
cancellation. 
Keywords: Acquisition, Earned Value, Survival Analysis, Cost Growth. 
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Using Earned Value Information to Predict 
Program Cancellation 
Introduction 
Since 2001, 12 major defense acquisition programs (MDAPs) have been 
cancelled.  Although each of these programs had problems with cost or schedule 
overruns (or both), there were other MDAPs that had similar problems and were not 
cancelled.  Is it possible that program managers had information that might help 
determine which program was likely to survive and which was more likely to be 
cancelled? 
MDAPs are programs designated by the Under Secretary of Defense for 
Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics (USD [AT&L]) as having an estimated 
eventual total expenditure for Research, Development, Test and Evaluation 
(RDT&E) of more than $365 million in fiscal year (FY) 2000 constant dollars or, for 
procurement, of more than $2.19 billion in FY 2000 constant dollars (Defense 
Acquisition University, 2012a).   
Information about cost and schedule performance for MDAPs is provided to 
DoD using Earned Value Management (EVM).  EVM is an integrated management 
approach that uses schedule, cost, and scope of work goals and measures 
progress towards achievement of these goals (Performance Assessments and Root 
Cause Analyses, 2013). It provides program management offices (PMOs) with 
information to measure progress against established baselines and is required for all 
MDAPs.  
This paper employs unique and rigorous statistical methodology to help 
program managers and their overseers understand and quantify the risk to their 
programs based on key earned value metrics.  It compares programs that were 
cancelled to programs with that had significant cost overruns but were not cancelled.  
We use survival analysis to investigate whether differences in key EV metrics 
reported for cancelled programs and “troubled” but not cancelled programs can be 
used to model the probability of cancellation for major acquisition programs.   
Specifically, we look at unclassified MDAPs cancelled since 2001 and similar 
programs that could be described as “troubled” but not cancelled in the same period 
of time. MDAPs were chosen because they are statutorily required to report EV data.  
We use the EV data reported in the Defense Acquisition Executive Summaries 
(DAES) on the government’s Defense Acquisition Management Information Retrieval 
(DAMIR) website.  
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Literature Review 
Most of the studies that have examined why MDAPs fail point to cost 
overruns as the primary cause.  Reasons cited include (1) excessively low initial 
cost estimates (Government Accountability Office, 2009; Sipple, White, & Greiner, 
2004), (2) expectation of cost overrun sharing causing firms to bid below cost 
estimate (Chen & Smith, 2001), (3) excessively low cost overrun estimates 
(Christensen, 1994), (4) technological immaturity (Dubos, Saleh, & Braun, 2007; 
Tyson, Harmon, & Utech, 1994), (5) unstable requirements (Augustine, 1997), and 
(6) overly optimistic schedules (Augustine 1997; Berteau et al., 2011).  
Charette (2008) pointed out that defense acquisitions problems have existed 
for decades, but the economic scope has changed. To put the scope of defense 
spending in context, the DoD’s 2013 portfolio of 80 MDAPs has a total estimated 
cost of $1.5 trillion (Government Accountability Office, 2014); Berteau et al. (2011) 
investigated the root cause of cost and schedule overruns and found that inaccurate 
cost estimates are associated with 40% of the accumulated cost overruns.  
Many authors advocate the use of EVM as a tool to help program managers 
and decision makers monitor early signs of cost growth (see, for example, Kerzner, 
2009 and Webb, 2003). Abba (1997) made it clear that the U.S. government and 
countries across the world have validated EVM as a highly effective program 
management tool. Christensen (1999) noted that EV provides program managers 
and contractors valuable insight into the cost and schedule status of the project 
and concluded through multiple studies that the estimate at completion (EAC) is 
one of the most critical values reported to PMs. 
Extensive research and experience have convinced both Congress and 
USD(AT&L) to conclude that EVM is a highly effective program management tool 
(Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, 2011; 
Weapon Systems Acquisition Reform Act, 2009).  The Weapon Systems Acquisition 
Reform Act of 2009 created the Director, Performance Assessment and Root 
Cause Analysis (PARCA) (Weapon Systems Acquisition Reform Act, 2009). USD 
AT&L has made PARCA responsible for EVM performance, oversight, and 
governance and for leading EVM improvements across the DoD (Under Secretary 
of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, 2011).   
Numerous factors are responsible for program cancellation. While many 
programs are troubled, not all of them are cancelled. This paper investigates 
whether there are significant differences in Earned Value metrics between cancelled 
and non-cancelled programs, and whether these metrics can help predict the 
ultimate cancellation and timing of cancellation of programs.  This paper 
hypothesizes that cancelled programs would have more unfavorable cumulative cost 
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and schedule variances, greater cost growth in the estimate at completion (EAC), 
and more disparity between the contractor and program manager cost estimates. 
Earned Value Management  
Earned Value Management is a widely accepted industry best practice that is 
used commercially and in the DoD to manage programs. It is an integrated 
management approach that uses schedule, cost, and scope of work goals and 
measures progress towards achievement of these goals (Performance Assessments 
and Root Cause Analyses, 2013).  It is a critical tool for engineering management 
and oversight of acquisition (Defense Acquisition University, 2012a). 
In simplest terms, EVM is a procedure for understanding, assessing, and 
quantifying what a contractor is achieving with contract dollars and to predict future 
performance. It works by establishing an integrated baseline that is developed from 
the work defined in the work breakdown structure and its associated time-phased 
budget. As work is performed, its corresponding budget (“earned value”) can be 
measured against the integrated baseline. Cost and schedule variances can be 
calculated and analyzed. These variances can help management determine if a 
project is ahead or behind schedule and above or below budget, and where to focus 
additional resources to remedy the problem.  
EVM Statutes, Policy, and DoD Implementation 
EVM evolved during the 1990s from service unique cost and schedule 
performance criteria called the Cost/Schedule Control System Criteria (C/SCSC) 
into a set of 32 industry-owned guidelines called the Earned Value Management 
System (EVMS; Defense Acquisition University, 2012b). The requirement for 
MDAPs to use EVM is stipulated in three laws: 
 Government Performance and Results Act of 1993 (GPRA) 
 Federal Acquisition Streamlining Act of 1994 Title V (FASA) 
 Clinger–Cohen Act of 1996 
These acts provide the legal basis for the policies implementing EVM. At the 
executive branch level, the primary policy document governing EVM is the Office of 
Management and Budget (OMB) Circular A-11, Part 7, Capital Programming Guide, 
which requires the use of EVM or some similar system “for risk and program 
management of capital asset acquisition” and “to establish cost, schedule, and 
performance goals for major acquisitions and then achieve on average, 90% of 
these goals” (Office of Management and Budget, 2006). The DoD, as an agency of 
the federal government, has issued its own directives—the DoDD 5000.01 (Office of 
the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, & Logistics 
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[OUSD(AT&L)], 2007) and DoDI 5000.02 (OUSD[AT&L], 2008)—to address the 
statutory and regulatory requirements of acquisition of all military systems. These 
documents along with the Federal Acquisitions Regulation (FARs) and the Defense 
Federal Acquisitions Regulation (DFARs) provide the explicit requirements1 for use 
of EVM in DoD MDAPs. 
The Weapon Systems Reform Act of 2009 created the PARCA and charged 
the organization with conducting and overseeing performance assessments and root 
cause analyses for MDAPs (Weapon System Acquisition Reform Act, 2009). 
PARCA’s assessments evaluate the cost, schedule, and performance requirements 
relative to current metrics (Defense Acquisition University 2012a). Additionally, 
PARCA is the policy holder for EV; they are responsible for the implementation and 
use of EVM across the DoD and for evaluating the utility of performance metrics 
used to measure cost, schedule, and performance of MDAPs (Under Secretary of 
Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, 2011). 
In a recent DoD memorandum entitled “Earned Value Management Systems 
Performance, Oversight, and Governance,” the USD(AT&L) provided direction to 
improve the effectiveness of EV across the DoD. Specifically, he reemphasized that 
EVM must be applied in a disciplined manner and that the data provided by EVM 
must be accurate, reliable and timely (Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, 
Technology, and Logistics, 2011). The Defense Contract Management Agency’s 
(DCMA) is responsible for EVM System compliance within the DoD. (Under 
Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, 2011). In this role, 
DCMA conducts EVMS reviews of all MDAPs to ensure compliance of EV 
standards. The DCMA’s Earned Value Management Implementation Guide (EVMIG) 
is the DoD’s principle guidance document for EV. 
EVM Reporting Requirements 
The three primary vehicles for reporting EVM information are (1) Selected 
Acquisition Reports (SARs) to Congress,2 (2) Defense Acquisition Executive 
Summary (DAES)3 reports to senior level DoD decision-makers4, and (3) the 
                                            
1
 Current DoD regulation and policy requires EVMS on cost or incentive contracts, subcontracts, and 
intra- government work agreements valued at or greater than 20 million in then-year dollars. For 
efforts exceeding 50 million in then-year dollars, the EVMS must be validated or accepted by the 
Defense Contract Management Agency (Defense Acquisition University 2012a). 
2
 DoD must submit Selected Acquisition Reports (SARs) for all MDAPs annually. The frequency is 
increased should the MDAP fail to achieve certain performance thresholds contained in 10 USC § 
2432—Selected Acquisition Reports. The SARs enable USD(AT&L) to meet statutory reporting 
requirements of all MDAPs to Congress (Defense Acquisition University 2012a). 
3
 DAESs are submitted quarterly or monthly depending on whether certain performance thresholds 
are met. The DAES process enables the USD(AT&L) to fulfill statutory requirements to manage and 
oversee MDAPs. The goal of the DAES process is to facilitate communication between, and provide 
feedback to, key stakeholders in OSD, the Joint Staff, the Components, and Program Offices. It is 
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Integrated Program Management Report (IPMR)5 to program managers. The goal of 
all of these reports is to facilitate communication between and provide feedback to 
key stakeholders in Congress, DoD, and the program offices. Typically, the EV data 
for MDAPs is reported monthly by the contractor in Contract Performance Reports 
(formats 1 through 5)6 and in the IPMR for use by internal program management. A 
portion of this data is included monthly in the DAES database, quarterly in the formal 
DAES reports for use by DoD executives, and annually in the SARs for use by 
Congress.7 The DAES reports are the source documents for EV data in this 
research.  
Earned Value Terminology 
The following definitions are necessary to understand the analysis and 
findings of this report. The definitions come from the EVMIG (Defense Contract 
Management Agency 2006) and the Defense Acquisition University Glossary of 
Defense Acquisition and Terms (DAU, 2009).8 
 Budgeted Cost of Work Scheduled (BCWS or “planned value”): the 
sum of the budgets for all work scheduled to be accomplished with a 
given time period. Also called the Performance Measurement Baseline 
(PMB). BCWSCUM represents the cumulative BCWS at a certain point 
of the contract. 
 Actual Cost of Work Performed (ACWP or  “actual costs”): the costs 
actually incurred and recorded in accomplishing the work performed 
within a given time period. ACWPCUM represents the cumulative ACWP 
at a certain point of the contract. 
 Budgeted Cost of Work Performed (BCWP or “earned value”): the 
value of completed work in terms of the work’s assigned budget. 
BCWPCUM represents the cumulative BCWP at a certain point of the 
contract. 
                                                                                                                                       
important to note that the DAES is an internal management system meant to fulfill the needs of senior 
Department of Defense executives and is NOT for general public consumption (Defense Acquisition 
University 2012a). 
4
 For the remainder of this study the general collective term “DoD executives,” “DoD officials,” or 
“senior level DoD decision makers” refers to USD(AT&L), Program Executive Office (PEO), the 
Milestone Decision Authority (MDA), and their associated staffs. 
5 
The IPMR provides performance data that is used to identify problems early in the contract and 
forecast future contract performance (Defense Acquisition University, 2012a). 
6
 Contract Performance Reports formats 1 through 5 are prepared by the contractor and are the 
primary means for reporting contract performance data. Their periodicity is typically monthly unless 
tailored for specific program. 
7
 These periodicities are subject to change based on the program. 
8 
Except where specific citation is made in this section, it is to be assumed that the definition came 
from one of these two sources. 
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 Schedule Variance (SV): the algebraic difference between earned 
value and the budget (SV = BCWP – BCWS). A positive value is a 
favorable condition (ahead of schedule) while a negative value is 
unfavorable (behind schedule). 
 Schedule Variance Percentage (SV%): indicates how much ahead or 
behind schedule the project is in terms of percentage. A positive value 
is a favorable condition (percent ahead of schedule) while a negative 
value is unfavorable (percent behind schedule). It may be expressed 
as a value for aspecific period of time or for cumulative to date. SV% = 
(SV/BCWS) × 100 (TutorialsPoint, 2013). 
 Schedule Performance Index (SPI): EV performance factor 
representing schedule efficiency. Calculated by dividing the Budgeted 
Cost for Work Performed (BCWP) by the Budgeted Cost for Work 
Scheduled (BCWS). This metric is one of the performance factors used 
in EAC calculations. 
 Cost Variance (CV): the algebraic difference between earned value 
and actual cost (CV = BCWP – ACWP). A positive value indicates a 
favorable condition (under budget) and a negative value indicates an 
unfavorable condition (over budget). 
 Cost Variance Percentage (CV%): indicates how much over or under 
budget the project is in terms of percentage. It indicates how much less 
or more money has been used to complete the work as planned in 
terms of percentage.  A positive value is a favorable condition (percent 
under budget) while a negative value is unfavorable (percent over 
budget). It may be expressed as a value for a specific period of time or 
for cumulative to date. CV % = (CV/BCWP) × 100 (TutorialsPoint, 
2013). 
 Cost Performance Index (CPI): EV performance factor representing 
cost efficiency. Calculated by dividing the Budgeted Cost for Work 
Performed (BCWP) by the Actual Cost of Work Performed. This metric 
is one of the performance factors used in EAC calculations. 
 Budget at Completion (BAC): The sum of all budgets established for 
the contract. BAC is a term that may also be applied to lower levels, 
such as the PMB or at the control account level. 
 Estimate at Completion (EAC): the estimated total cost for all 
authorized work. Equal to the sum of actual costs to date (including all 
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allocable indirect costs), plus the estimated costs to completion 
(estimate to complete). 
 Estimate to Complete (ETC): estimate of costs to complete all work 
from a given point in time to the end of the contract. 
 Variance reset: when a contract’s cost and/or schedule variances are 
reset to zero. This is done to improve managerial control over the 
work remaining on a contract. 
When the BCWS, ACWP, and BCWP are obtained for a period, numerous 
additional EV metrics can be calculated including the SPI, SV%, CPI, CV%, ETC, 
and EAC, that are helpful to understand how the program is performing and to 
predict future performance based on the contract’s past performance.  Figure 1 
illustrates the relationship of BCWS, ACWP, and BCWP for a project that is over-
budget (ACWP>BCWP) and behind schedule (BCWP<BCWS). 
 
Figure 1. Graphical Depiction of EV Metrics for a Sample Project  
(Vargas, 2009) 
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Calculating EAC 
EAC is used to determine whether sufficient funds are available to cover the 
cost of the contract at completion.  A common way for programs to calculate their 
EAC is by using formulas that use contractor’s efficiency to date as measured by the 
CPI and SPI. Equation 1 illustrates that EAC is equal to the amount of money 
already spent on the contract or Actual Cost of Work Performed (ACWP) plus the 
amount of money it will take to complete the contract or the Estimate to Complete 
(ETC). 
                                                                             ( ) 
The ACWP is an accounting figure reported monthly by the contractor in the CPRs. 
The ETC on the other hand is a forecast that can be calculated in numerous ways. 
The generic formula for calculating ETC is contained in Equation 2: 
    
           
     
                                                                  (2) 
Use of different performance indices results in different EAC forecasts. The 
two indices used primarily in the DoD (but not mandated) are cost performance 
index and composite index. Use of these indices results in the EACCPI, referred to as 
the “best case” EAC, and the EACComposite, which is called the “worst case” EAC 
(“DAU Gold Card–July 20 2,” 2012). These EAC values are reported as best and 
worst case EACs in the monthly DAES reports. 
(1) Best Case EAC. The best case approach for calculating EAC involves 
using the current CPI of the program as the performance index. It assumes that the 
rest of the work remaining will be done according to the same cost efficiency 
recorded to date. Equation 3 depicts this relationship: 
       
           
   
                                                          ( ) 
Substituting ETCCPI into Equation 1 results in the EACCPI expression in 
Equation 4. 
            
           
   
                                                ( ) 
(2) Worst Case EAC. The worst case approach for calculating EAC involves 
using a composite performance index called the schedule cost index (SCI). Equation 
5 shows the SCI expression. 
                                                                                ( ) 
It assumes that the rest of the future work will follow the cost efficiency 
determined by the cost performance index (CPI), as well as the schedule efficiency 
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determined by the scheduled performance index, generating the SCI. Equation 6 
depicts this relationship: 
     
           
   
                                                            ( ) 
This approach incorporates a tendency for programs to perform with CPIs 
and SPIs less than one (an indication of inefficiency). The product of two indices 
less than one has the compounding effect of raising the ETC more than using the 
CPI alone and consequently results in a higher EAC forecasts than the best case 
approach (see Equation 7). 
          
           
   
                                                ( ) 
This study uses the earned value data reported in the Defense Acquisition 
Executive Summaries (DAES) on the government’s Defense Acquisition 
Management Information Retrieval (DAMIR) website.  DAMIR is a DoD initiative 
that streamlines acquisition management and oversight by leveraging numerous 
government databases into one central repository. The DAMIR databases used in 
this study were the Selected Acquisition Report (SAR) and the Services’ Defense 
Acquisition Executive Summary (DAES). The DAES information contains some of 
the earned value data from the contract performance reports (DD Forms 2734/1–5, 
APR 2005) on a nearly monthly basis (not all EV data available in the CPR formats 
1–5 is available for study). The SARs, in the most extreme case, are published 
three times per year, but more typically are published once annually and do not 
contain sufficient EV data for meaningful analysis in this study; however, the SAR is 
useful because it provides background information on each program and some 
explanations of program actions taken. The analysis reported in this thesis is based 
almost exclusively on the DAES data because of the frequency and quality of the EV 
data provided in DAES. 
Program Selection 
Since 2001, 12 MDAPs were cancelled before they could field an operational 
system (Harrison, 2011). These programs are listed in Table 1. Of the 12 cancelled 
programs, DAMIR earned value data was available for the eight programs 
annotated with an asterisk. These eight programs made up the cancelled programs 
sample of this study. 
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Table 1. Major Programs Cancelled Since 2001 Without Fielding Any 
Operational Systems 
(adapted from Harrison, 2011) 
 
Conceivably, more can be learned by comparing cancelled programs to 
fellow troubled programs than by comparison to on-track programs. One would 
expect the on-track programs to outperform the cancelled programs in most, if not 
all, earned value performance metrics.  For this study we define a troubled program 
as a program that experienced consecutive unfavorable (negative) cumulative cost 
or schedule variance percentages greater than 10%. The selection criterion used 
for the comparison sample of the non-cancelled programs was three-fold: (1) the 
program was not cancelled, (2) earned value data was available for the major 
program, and (3) the program had to be troubled (as defined above). 
Eight programs were selected from the 90 active programs in DAMIR for 
use as a control group. The programs are organized by service on DAMIR and 
then alphabetized within the service. The first row of each service was analyzed 
until eight programs that met the criteria were obtained. The first eight non-
cancelled programs that met the criteria for troubled programs were chosen as the 
comparison sample of non-cancelled programs. These programs are listed Table 2. 
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Table 2. Comparison Sample of Troubled Non-Cancelled Major Programs 
(Hodgson, 2013) 
 
This study hypothesized that the variables presented in Table 3 were the 
most likely differentiators of cancelled programs.  In order to sufficiently analyze 
the hypotheses that these variables are different in cancelled programs, the following 
EV data was collected for each program: 
 Cost variance percentage 
 Schedule variance percentage 
 Program Manager’s Estimate at Completion (PM EAC) 
 Contractor’s Estimate at Completion 
 Cost variance resets 
 Schedule variance resets 
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All MDAPs have multiple contracts for each phase of the weapons systems 
development to handle different components and functions of systems 
acquisition. To maintain consistency between the samples, the largest 
Engineering and Manufacturing Development phase contract was used for each 
program. The available raw data for the variables for each program’s largest EMD 
contract was extracted from the DAMIR site under the “Earned Value” tab using the 
“Cumulative” and “Summary” reports. While the DAES reports are missing some 
data, sufficient data existed for each program to conduct the analysis. 
Cost Variance Percentage 
The cost variance percentages were extracted from every CPR available in 
the DAES reports. Hodgson (2013) calculated the mean and medians presented in 
Table 4. We note that the overall median and mean CV% of non-cancelled programs 
is more unfavorable than the cancelled programs, which suggests that the non-
cancelled programs are at least as “troubled” as their cancelled counterpart. 
Additionally, it suggests that CV% may not be a discriminating variable in a 
program’s survival.  
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Table 4. CV Percentage Means and Medians of All Programs in Study 
(Hodgson, 2013) 
 
Hodgson (2013) used the same CV% data to examine the impact of the 
timing of cost variance percentages on program cancellation at the 25% and 50% 
completion points of the contract. For these two completion points, the average of 
the CV% within +/- 5% of the respective completion points was used for the CV% of 
each program. Tables 5 and 6 contain the CV% at these completion points for the 
sampled cancelled and non-cancelled programs (note: data for VH-71 and ACS 
were not available in DAES for these contract completion points). 
Table 5. Cancelled Programs’ CV Percentages at 25% and 50% Contract 
Completion Points  
(Hodgson, 2013) 
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Table 6. Non-Cancelled Programs’ CV Percentages at 25% and 50% 
Contract Completion Points 
(Hodgson, 2013) 
 
On average, cancelled programs in the study had more unfavorable CV% at 
the later stages of the contract; however, the median CV% appears to improve from 
25% to 50% completion point. Table 6 shows that both the mean and median CV% 
becomes more unfavorable over time for the sampled non-cancelled programs. 
When comparing the mean CV% between cancelled and non-cancelled programs in 
Tables 5 and 6, cancelled programs maintain worse CV% at the 25% completion 
point, but slightly more favorable at the 50% completion point. These observations 
are not intuitive and make drawing any initial conclusions difficult. 
Schedule Variance Percentage 
The schedule variance percentages were extracted and compiled from every 
available CPR in the DAES reports. Hodgson (2013) calculated the mean and 
median for each program presented in Table 7. The mean SV percentage is slightly 
more unfavorable (more negative) in cancelled programs while the cancelled 
programs’ median SV% is slightly less unfavorable. 
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Table 7. SV Percentage Means and Medians of All Programs in Study 
(Hodgson, 2013) 
 
To analyze the timing of schedule variances and their potential effect on 
cancellation, Hodgson (2013) used the same SV% data. For the 25% and 50% 
completion points of the contract, the average of the SV% within +/- 5% of these 
completion points was used for the SV% of each program. Tables 8 and 9 contain 
the SV% at these completion points for the sampled cancelled and non-cancelled 
program. 
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Table 9. Non-Cancelled Programs’ SV Percentages at 25% and 50% 
Contract Completion Points 
(Hodgson, 2013) 
 
Table 8 suggests that on average cancelled programs have more favorable 
SV% at the later stages of the contract. Table 9 shows that while the mean SV% 
seems to improve over time, the median SV% becomes more unfavorable for the 
sampled non-cancelled programs. When comparing the mean and median SV% 
between cancelled and non-cancelled programs in Tables 9 and 10, cancelled 
programs maintain worse SV% at the 25% completion point. There is conflicting 
evidence between the mean and median SV% at the 50% point. Again, these 
general observations based on very small sample sizes make drawing initial 
conclusions challenging. 
Cost Growth 
To analyze cost growth as a potential discriminating variable, Hodgson 
(2013) recorded the program manager estimate at completion and contractor EACs 
for every CPR. Initially the cumulative cost growth, that is, the difference between 
the EAC at the beginning of the contract and the current EAC would seem the 
logical metric. However, due to changes in the program baseline (“re-baselining”) 
during the course of the contract, the cumulative cost growth did not prove a 
consistent measure from program to program. When a program experiences 
significant cost growth or schedule delays, it is not uncommon for the program 
manager to request that it be “re-baselined.”  This gives the program a fresh start, 
and leads to a new “beginning” EAC. One possible way to handle the effect of re- 
baselining is to consider the re-baselined program a new program. This method was 
discarded because it was difficult to determine in some cases when or if a program 
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had been re-baselined (and in some cases the EAC would go down without any 
evidence of re-baselining). 
Alternatively, it is possible to ignore the re-baselined EAC and continue to 
calculate the difference between the original EAC and the current EAC. Doing so is 
problematic however, as it fails to recognize that some programs are re-baselined 
due to changes in scope or requirements, so that the observed cost growth is not 
indicative of program health, but merely a reflection of legitimate changes in program 
scope. Since the objective of this research was to find variables that may predict 
program cancellation, measuring the difference between the original EAC and the 
new EAC could be misleading. 
To address the difficulties mentioned above, a cost growth metric was 
constructed by Hodgson (2013) to facilitate comparison of programs. The purpose of 
the metric is to measure the cumulative effect of marginal changes in the EAC. This 
metric has the advantage that it is less distorted by re-baselining yet still captures 
the overall effect of increases in the EAC from the beginning of the program to the 
current period. The metric for both PM EAC and contractor EAC was calculated 
using Equation 8: 
                                    
                  
       
           ( ) 
This constructed metric provides a conservative estimate of the cost growth 
experienced by a program, while eliminating the problems caused by re-baselining. 
This metric is hereafter referred to as “cost growth.” Note that the cumulative cost 
growth percentage (computed by taking the difference between the current EAC and 
the original EAC and dividing the difference by the original EAC) will always be 
higher than the “cost growth” metric.  
For the 25% and 50% contract completion points, the average cost growths 
within +/- 5% of 25% and 50% completion points, respectively, were computed by 
Hodgson (2013) and used for the cost growth of each program. The total cost 
growths and cost growths at 25% and 50% completion points were calculated for all 
programs in the study and are presented in Tables 10 through 13. Where data is 
missing, it is because it was unavailable in DAES. 
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Table 10. Cost Growth for Cancelled Programs (PM EAC) 
(Hodgson, 2013) 
 
Table 11. Cost Growth for Non-Cancelled Programs (PM EAC) 
(Hodgson, 2013) 
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Table 12. Cost Growth for Cancelled Programs (Contractor EAC) 
(Hodgson, 2013) 
 
Table 13. Cost Growth for Non-Cancelled Programs (Contractor EAC) 
 
We can make some general observations from Tables 11 through 14. As 
expected, regardless of estimate type, the cost growth metric increases as programs 
progress. In addition, cost growth appears to be significantly higher in cancelled 
programs than in the non-cancelled counterparts. Moreover, the data appears to 
show that the there are fewer differences in program manager and contractor 
estimates in non-cancelled programs and that the greatest difference in estimates 
appears to occur at the 50% completion point of cancelled programs. 
Differences in the Estimates at Completion 
To investigate the potential effect the differences between the two estimates 
may have on cancellation, Hodgson (2013) first normalized the differences. The 
calculation to normalize the differences is based on the PM EAC and Contractor 
EAC values reported in each program’s CPR in the DAES report.  To normalize the 
differences for program comparison, the magnitude of the difference is divided by its 
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corresponding program manager’s estimate at completion for each program. For 
example, if the program manager’s estimate at completion was $5,000 and the 
contractor’s estimate at completion was $ ,500 at a certain contract completion 
percentage, the difference between the two estimates is $500 and the normalized 
difference is $500/$5,000 or 0.10. 
The data were organized into the following four periods to study the potential 
effects of the timing of the difference: (1) total normalized difference, (2) 
normalized difference from 0–25% contract completion point, (3) normalized 
difference from 26–50% contract completion point, and (4) normalized difference 
from 51–75% contract completion point. The median total EAC difference and 
averages of the three periods’ EACs were calculated for each program in the study 
and are presented in Tables 14 and 15. The cells of the table that remain empty did 
not have sufficient data for analysis. 
Table 14. Normalized Differences in Program Manager and Contractor EAC 
for Cancelled Programs 
(Hodgson, 2013) 
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Table 15. Normalized Differences in Program Manager and Contractor EAC 
for Non-Cancelled Programs 
(Hodgson, 2013) 
 
The medians and means tell two different stories in this case. A comparison 
of the medians reveals that the EAC difference is worse (greater) in non-cancelled 
programs for all but the 0–25% group, whereas, a comparison of the means 
suggests that cancelled programs have worse EAC differences in all groups but the 
26–50%. Conclusions cannot be made from simply comparing the means and 
medians in this way, but it is useful in providing a general sense of how the 
difference in estimates may effect cancellation. 
Methodology 
To understand how cancelled programs, and non-cancelled but troubled 
programs differ from each other, we examine differences in earned value metrics.  
The challenge we face is that the small number of programs limits our sample size 
and our ability to use parametric methods.  Using methodology that works for small 
sample sizes, Hodgson (2013) examined whether cancelled and non-cancelled 
programs are different on average in terms of their earned value metrics.  We look at 
whether we can use earned value metrics to predict the probability of failure, and we 
look at whether over time, the risk of program failure changes.   
Building on the differences observed in Mann-Whitney by Hodgson (2013), 
we want to estimate the probability of program cancellation based on earned value 
metrics.  In most applications where the dependent variable is binary, maximum 
likelihood techniques such as Logit or Probit are used instead of OLS because they 
constrain the outcome probability to be less than 100% and more than 0%, where 
linear models can estimate probabilities outside these bounds.  Probit and logit 
better handle dichotomous variables by using an iterative optimization routine to 
maximize a log likelihood function (Kennedy, 2003). 
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Unfortunately, maximum likelihood estimators like logit are generally 
unreliable when samples are small (Statistical Consulting Group, 2014).  Maximum 
likelihood estimators suffers from bias when sample sizes are small or the ratio of 1s 
to 0s is skewed, a tendency exacerbated by the inclusion of many explanatory 
variables (Long, 1997).  Exact logit is the prescribed solution in the case of small 
sample sizes, where traditional maximum likelihood estimation is undesirable as it 
produces inconsistent results (Hart & Clark, 1999).  As we only have 16 
observations, in addition to exact logistic we limit the inclusion of explanatory 
variables to include them one at time.  Exact logistic returns the log odds of the 
outcome variable as a linear model of the predictor variables.  We can interpret the 
coefficients as odds ratios meaning the coefficient is essentially a multiplier.  
Secondly, we consider program survival using parametric survival analysis.  
We can think of program survival as sick patient survival over time after treatment.  
In this analysis we look at time in four periods—between 0–25% complete, 25%–
50% complete, 50%–75% complete, and 75–100% complete to evaluate the impact 
of program development and earned value metrics over the program’s development 
on the probability of cancellation.  We model this parametrically with proportional 
hazard functions using an exponential model, which keeps time neutral.   
We cannot use all variables together in the same models—schedule variance 
is highly correlated with cost variance, and estimate at completion growth of both 
contractors and program managers are too highly correlated with each other.  
Schedule variance is also too highly correlated with both EAC growths figures.  Thus 
we break down our analysis into single variable models and then add cost variance 
to the EAC at completion variance models as a control   
Results 
Exact Logistics 
Using exact logistic we measured the impact of seven EV metrics on the 
probability of troubled program cancellation testing each variable separately.  The 
results are shown in Table 16.  We show the coefficients for each model along with 
the standard deviation (in parentheses).  Asterisks indicate significant results.  The 
model score is a chi-squared score and the p value beneath it gives the overall 
significance of the model.  Not surprisingly, as these are univariate models—the 
models with significant p are also the models with a significant model score.   
Acquisition Research Program 
Graduate School of Business & Public Policy - 23 - 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Table 16. Exact Logistics Models for EV Metrics 
 MODELS 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
        
Cost Variance 1.33* 
      
 
(0.084) 
      
Cost Variance Reset 
Frequency  
1.64 
     
  
(0.73) 




    
   
(0.919) 
    
Schedule Variance Reset Freq 
   
0.827 
   
    
(1) 
   
Cost Growth PM EAC 
    
2.68 
  
     
(0.23) 
  
Cost Growth Contractor EAC 
     
8.74* 
 
      
(0.05) 
 
Contractor and PM EAC Diff 
      
26.7 
       
(0.92) 
observations 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 
model score 2.4 0.48 0.06 0.09 1.56 2.65 0.3 
p value 0.08 0.73 0.92 1 0.23 0.05 0.92 
 
The coefficients for exact logit give a multiplier for the likelihood of program 
cancellation.  We find that the cost growth based on the contractor’s estimate is a 
significant indicator of program cancellation.  Programs with one hundred percent 
cost growth are 8.74 times more likely to experience program cancellation. In other 
words, a 10% cost growth increases the chances of a program being cancelled by 
73%.  We also find that programs with high but positive cost variance are more likely 
to suffer program cancellation.  Specifically, programs with 100% positive cost 
variance are 33% more likely to experience a cancellation. Both of these results are 
statistically significant at the 10% level.  
Hazard Function 
We next use Hazard functions to look at the risks to programs over their 
maturity from their EV metrics.  The results are shown in Table 17. 
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Table 17. Hazard Functions for EV Metrics 
 Models 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES       
       
Schedule Variance 0.0222      
 (0.0614)      
Cost Variance  0.0472   0.0493 0.0514 
  (0.0410)   (0.0462) (0.0458) 
Cost Growth  Contractor EAC   0.540**  0.535**  
   (0.256)  (0.255)  
Cost Growth  PM EAC    0.511*  0.502* 
    (0.266)  (0.265) 
Constant -1.718*** -1.598*** -2.179*** -2.230*** -1.941*** -1.976*** 
 (0.459) (0.378) (0.463) (0.460) (0.477) (0.476) 
       
Observations 50 50 46 50 46 50 
Looking at the hazard functions, we find that cost and schedule variance are 
less important predictors than cost growth based on contractor or program manager 
estimates at completion which are significant at 5% and 10% levels respectively.  To 
understand the impact of any factor on the hazard of program cancellation we 
exponentiate the coefficient which gives us a hazard ratio or multiplier.  Here a 100 
percentage point change in estimate at completion leads to a 65% to 75% increase 
in the likelihood of cancellation, or a 10% increase in the estimate would lead to a 
6.5% to 7.5% increase in the likelihood of program cancellation with or without 
controlling for cost variance.   
Conclusions 
This research investigated whether there are differences in the key earned 
value metrics of cancelled and troubled non- cancelled programs, and whether 
these metrics can help predict the likelihood of program cancellation.  Hodgson 
(2013) found that cancelled and non-cancelled programs do vary across their EVM 
characteristics.  We expanded his work by examining the data with two more 
sophisticated techniques, exact logit and hazard analysis. 
Our most significant finding across models is that when there is high cost 
growth in the EAC reported by the contractor, programs run far larger risks of 
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cancellation.  This may be because contractors have more insight into their cost 
structures and are better able to predict EAC, or it may be that program managers 
are reluctant to increase their EAC given the consequences they would face under 
the Nunn–McCurdy Act.9  We find less robust evidence that increases in PM 
estimates and high cost variance also can drive risk of program cancellation. 
We note that the cost growth metric (Equation 8) was developed by Hodgson 
(2013) and is not reported as EVM data.  Given the significance of this metric in 
predicting program cancellation, we recommend program managers consider using 
this metric to monitor expected cost growth. 
 
                                            
9
 The Nunn–McCurdy Act (10 U.S.C. § 2433) requires that DoD report to Congress whenever an 
MDAP experiences cost overruns that exceed certain thresholds. The purpose of the act is to help 
control cost growth in major defense systems by holding the appropriate Pentagon officials and 
defense contractors publicly accountable and responsible for managing costs. 
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